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ISSUES RELATED TO THE OPERATION AND INVESTMENT
OF S.C. PUBLIC PENSIONSPURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
Members of the S.C. General
Assembly asked the
Legislative Audit Council to
review the operations of
South Carolina’s state-
administered pension funds. 
We reviewed federal and
state law, accounting and
actuarial standards,
investment returns, funded
status, contributions, asset
allocation, transparency, and
conflicts of interest.
The pension system is
administered by the Public
Employee Benefit Authority
(PEBA), while the assets are
invested by the Retirement
System Investment
Commission (RSIC).  
As of FY 13-14, the five
state-administered pensions
reported $29.9 billion in
assets and $49.2 billion in
liabilities. 
The system is comprised of
approximately 70% local
public employees and 30%
state employees.
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A Review of the Public Pensions
Administered by the State of South Carolina
WE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES DURING OUR REVIEW.
# South Carolina’s state-administered pensions have been
significantly underfunded for more than a decade and are
projected to remain underfunded for more than 30 years.
Severe downturns in the investment markets could cause the
already low-funded status of the pensions to decline to
significantly lower levels.
 
# The returns on pension investments have been below the
assumed rate of return established by state law, as well as the
returns in other states. 
# Over the last decade, an increasing percentage of pension dollars
has been placed in investments with higher expected rates of
return and higher fees. The risks associated with these
investments have not been fully stated in the annual reports of
the pension system.
# When selecting an assumed rate of return on pension
investments, the General Assembly is not required by state law
to consider the impact of its decision on asset allocation, various
forms of investment risk, probability of success, or pension
liabilities.
# Public pensions nationwide may be underreporting their
liabilities based on a comparison of their calculation methods
with those used by a major bond credit rating agency,
corporations, and financial economists.
# Controls regarding potential conflicts of interest could be
improved.
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FUNDED STATUS OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S PENSIONS
South Carolina’s state-administered
pensions are significantly
underfunded due to inadequate
contributions over time and the
underperformance of investments. 
From FY 04-05 through FY 13-14,
the funded ratio (market value of
assets divided by liabilities)
reported for the state’s two largest
pensions combined decreased from
73.4% to 60.9%. South Carolina’s
funded status in FY 13-14 was
16 percentage points below the
national average of 77% as reported
by Wilshire Consulting.
Source: Gabriel Roeder Smith & Company 
The RSIC and the Bank of New York
Mellon reported that, for the 10-year
period ending in FY 14-15, South
Carolina’s annualized rate of return
on pension investments was 5.21%,
compared with a current assumed
rate of return of 7.50%. For the same
period, public pensions nationally
had an annualized return of 6.91%.
These figures are gross of fees. According to BNY Mellon, “[g]ross of fees return
is actually a mixed return. In general, the alternative investments are only
reported on a net of fee basis; therefore, the total plan gross of fee return
consists of the gross returns for the traditional assets [stocks, bonds, etc.] and
the net returns for the alternatives [hedge funds, private equity, etc].” 
Source: RSIC and Bank of New York Mellon
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PROJECTION OF INVESTMENT RETURNS AND FUNDED STATUS
SELECTING AN ASSUMED RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENTS
AND DETERMINING THE VALUE OF PENSION LIABILITIES
At the request of the LAC, in July 2015, the RSIC’s primary investment consultant projected the
investment returns and funded status of the two largest pension funds combined for a 30-year period
based on two inflation rate assumptions.
The first projection was based on the assumed
inflation rate of 2.75% currently used by
PEBA’s actuary. The RSIC’s consulting firm
calculated a 50% probability that in 2043 the
two largest pensions combined will have a:
# 30-year rate of return of 7.3%.
# Funded ratio of 93%.
# Funding shortfall of $7 billion.
Using its own inflation rate assumption of 2.1%,
the RSIC’s consulting firm calculated a 50%
probability that in 2043 the two largest pension
funds combined will have a:
# 30-year rate of return of 6.8%.
# Funded ratio of 87%.
# Funding shortfall of $11 billion.
The current inflation projection of the Federal
Reserve Bank is approximately 2%.
In 2012, the South Carolina General Assembly
established an assumed rate of investment return
of 7.5%. The RSIC is charged with achieving
the assumed rate of return over the long run to
ensure full funding of the pensions.  
State law, however, does not require the General
Assembly to consider the impact of the assumed
rate of return selected on asset allocation,
investment risk, the probability of success, or
pension liabilities.
According to the Governmental Accounting
Standards Board, the interest rate selected by a
public pension for its assumed rate of return on
investments may also be used as a discount rate
to value future liabilities.  When a public
pension increases the assumed rate of return on
its investments, it decreases its reported
liabilities.
When a pension decreases the assumed rate of
return on investments, it increases its reported
liabilities.
Public pensions nationwide may be understating
their liabilities. They use significantly higher
interest rates (generally 7% to 8%) to value
future pension liabilities than the interest rates
(3% to 5%) currently used by corporations, a
major bond credit rating agency, and financial
economists. 
During our review, we requested that the PEBA
actuary calculate the effect of various assumed
rates of return on pension liabilities. If South
Carolina had used an assumed rate of return one
percentage point lower (6.5%) at the end of
2014, the reported liabilities for its two largest
plans would have increased from $48.9 billion
to $54.7 billion.
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ASSET ALLOCATION
Amendments to the South Carolina Constitution
have allowed the state pension portfolio to
transition from all fixed income investments
(cash and corporate and government bonds) to a
portfolio that also includes stocks and
alternative investments, such as hedge funds,
private equity funds, real estate, and
commodities. 
The chart below shows this transition as well as
a comparison of RSIC investment returns and
the returns of the Vanguard Balanced Index
Fund (VBINX) comprised of 60% stocks and
40% bonds.
INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS BY CATEGORY AND INVESTMENT RETURNS
RSIC *** 7.02% 5.10% 13.19% -2.70% -19.30% 13.80% 18.30% 0.40% 9.99% 15.29%
VBINX *** 7.76% 5.40% 14.44% -4.86% -13.69% 13.64% 20.27% 5.77% 12.10% 16.23%
* Prior to FY 12-13, cash, short duration and high yield held in strategic partnerships were classified as Alternatives. Beginning in
FY 12-13, these investments have been presented as cash and cash equivalents under Short Term Investments / Fixed Income.
** Prior to FY 13-14, derivatives such as futures, options, and swaps were recorded as Alternatives. Beginning in FY 13-14, based on
reclassifications, these amounts have been presented in the categories to which they pertain. 
*** The RSIC returns for 2007 through 2014 and all VBINX returns are reported net of fees.
Source: PEBA and Vanguard
ANNUALIZED RETURNS AS OF JUNE 30, 2014*
ONE-YEAR THREE-YEAR FIVE-YEAR TEN-YEAR
RSIC 15.29% 8.37% 11.48% 5.60%
VBINX 16.23% 11.28% 13.50% 7.23%
*Net of fees.
Source: RSIC, BNY Mellon, and Vanguard
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REPORTING OF RISK
Although these additional categories of
investment have higher expected rates of return,
they are accompanied by an increase in risk that
has been underreported by the RSIC and PEBA
in their annual reports.
 
According to RSIC staff, when the agency refers
to risk, it is usually referring to the volatility of
investment returns and the extent to which
investments within the portfolio have returns
that are correlated with each other.  Developing
a portfolio with diverse investments that are not
highly-correlated can reduce the overall
volatility of the portfolio.  
It is important to note that the correlation
between investments can increase significantly
during severe downturns in the investment
markets.
In addition to volatility, there are other
investment risks. Private equity funds and real
estate are examples of investments with
significant other risks, such as:
# Illiquidity that makes an asset difficult or
time-consuming to sell.
# Less frequent and less precise asset valuation,
which makes volatility estimates and
measures of risk-adjusted returns less precise.
# Lack of transparency regarding the terms of
the investment.
# Complexity of the terms of the investment.
# Leverage is the financing of an investment
using debt. RSIC officials reported during our
review that “[w]hile we do not allow leverage
at the plan level, we do invest in assets that
use leverage (stocks, real estate, private
equity, etc.).” 
Independent of its annual reports, the RSIC has
made public presentations to a state Senate
subcommittee in which various categories of
risk and risk mitigation processes were
addressed, such as asset allocation, complexity,
diversification, valuation of assets, liquidity, and
due diligence prior to investing.
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INVESTMENT FEES AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
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In addition to added risk, the change in asset
allocation of South Carolina’s pension portfolio
has resulted in higher investment fees and
expenses. Private equity funds, hedge funds,
private debt funds, and real estate, in particular,
have significantly higher fees than investments
in fixed income assets and publicly-traded
stocks.  
As shown below, during the ten-year period
from 2005 through 2014, fees increased from
$22.4 million, 0.1% of assets, to $467 million,
1.6% of assets.  
SOUTH CAROLINA RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
 INVESTMENT FEES AND EXPENDITURES
(IN MILLIONS)
Source: PEBA and RSIC
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EXCESSIVE PERIOD FOR ELIMINATING UNFUNDED LIABILITIES
OPTIONS FOR REDUCING UNFUNDED LIABILITIES
The period over which unfunded liabilities are
paid off (amortized) may exceed the 30-year
limit in state law. 
Excessive amortization periods can lead to
inter-generational inequity and negative
amortization (payments that are not sufficient to
cover the interest cost).
The underpayment of pension contributions by
one generation of employees and taxpayers is
being offset, in part, through a surcharge
imposed on the following generation.
In order to establish state bond credit ratings,
Moody’s Investors Service uses a 20-year
amortization period to assess the impact of
public pension unfunded liabilities. 
South Carolina’s state-administered pensions
have been significantly underfunded for more
than a decade and are projected to remain
underfunded for more than 30 years.  Severe
downturns in the investment markets could
cause the already low funded status of the
pensions to decline to significantly lower levels.
Such downturns may occur during a time of
economic recession and reduced tax revenues. 
Therefore, state and local governments might
not be able to address the impaired funded status
of the pensions without increasing taxes or
decreasing funding for other agencies and
programs.
By shortening the period for amortizing
unfunded liabilities to 20 years, there will be
less inequity in which future generations of
workers and taxpayers are required to pay for
the pension debts incurred by prior generations.
Twenty years is the period used by Moody’s
Investors Service.
There is a range of options to achieve a shorter
period for paying off unfunded liabilities. This
range depends, in part, on whether the level of
benefits remains constant or is subject to
adjustment.  For example:
# Without a reduction in existing pension
benefits, paying off unfunded liabilities over
a shorter period of time would require an
increase in contributions, which is more
certain to be successful, or improvement in
investment returns.  
# If reducing benefits were considered, a
number of current practices could be
examined, including the cost-of-living raises
paid to retirees.  To minimize new liabilities,
the General Assembly could examine the
option of transitioning from a pension-based
(defined benefit) system to a defined
contribution system in which each employee
manages her own retirement account. 
It is important to note that increasing required
employee contributions or decreasing benefits
could make it more difficult to recruit and retain
qualified staff. In certain instances, market
conditions could require that salaries be
increased to offset a significant decrease in net
retirement benefits.  In 2015, the General
Assembly funded an independent study of the
salaries of state agency employees in South
Carolina compared with the salaries of
employees with similar jobs in other
organizations.  The study is projected to be
completed in 2016.  
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FOR MORE
INFORMATION
Our full report, 
including comments from
relevant agencies, is
published on the Internet. 
Copies can also be obtained by
contacting our office.
LAC.SC.GOV
SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Legislative Audit Council
Independence, Reliability, Integrity
K. Earle Powell
Director 
1331 Elmwood Ave., Suite 315
Columbia, SC 29201
803.253.7612 (voice)
803.253.7639 (fax)
PENSION STAFF AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES
We found three areas in which South Carolina’s pension system could
reduce potential and actual conflicts of interest.
First, in 2013, an RSIC employee resigned and later accepted a
position with a timberland investment company in which the RSIC had
an investment.  In 2015, an RSIC employee accepted a position with a
company with which the RSIC had a contract.  Although RSIC
officials report that neither of these former employees has since made
contact with the agency in an attempt to influence its actions, the
restrictions on such contact in state law may not be adequate.
Second, investment proposals are sometimes directly or indirectly
made by RSIC commissioners, including:
# An investment of up to $30 million in a timberland investment
company in November 2011.
# An investment of up to $55 million in a private equity fund in
October 2014.   
Even though the RSIC requires commissioners to disclose their
involvement in identifying proposed investments, commissioner
involvement may reduce the objectivity of staff when analyzing the
merits of the proposals. Commissioner involvement may also reduce
the objectivity of other RSIC commissioners, who may be less likely to
reject an investment proposal knowing that it comes from a colleague.
Third, under RSIC policy, intermediaries called placement agents are
allowed to broker contracts between the RSIC and external investment
fund companies, such as hedge funds and private equity funds. 
Agency policy requires disclosure of the use of placement agents
during its due diligence process. From June 2010 through June 2012,
agency records indicate that nine investments involved placement
agents.  Although placement agents may enable smaller investment
fund companies to compete more effectively with larger companies,
those benefits have been accompanied by corruption in New York and
California.  In addition, a recent national study found that, on average,
investments involving placement agents underperform similar
investments without placement agents.
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